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S E C R E T ABU DHABI 03888

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S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003888

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/RA FEIERSTEIN; NEA/ARPI MISENHEIMER, WALKER,
THORNE, SMYTH; EB FOR A/S WAYNE, SALOOM, NELSON
TREASURY FOR OFAC WERNER
MANAMA FOR BEAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: [PTER](#) [KTFN](#) [EFIN](#) [TC](#)
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER

REF: A. SECSTATE 166846
[1](#)B. ABU DHABI 2169
[1](#)C. 2003 SECSTATE 133205
[1](#)D. 2003 ABU DHABI 2598
[1](#)E. 2003 ABU DHABI 2853

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S) Summary. Embassy thanks Department for forwarding Treasury's draft nonpaper on Human Appeal International (HAI), which is intended for OFAC Director Bob Werner's use during his 9/16-20 visit to the UAE (ref A). Embassy strongly recommends against passing the paper as currently drafted to the UAEG. We support passing a well-sourced, actionable paper on HAI. However, we believe that the current draft does not effectively make the case. When we take a case to the UAEG asking them to take action against this charity, the case needs to be based on current, credible intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility with our interlocutors. End summary.

[1](#)2. (S) In 2003, Embassy Abu Dhabi raised the USG concern that the Ajman-based HAI supports terrorist organizations, such as al-Qa'ida and HAMAS, with UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed. At the time, Sheikh Hamdan agreed to undertake a thorough investigation of HAI, but requested an intel package that could be shared with appropriate UAE intelligence agencies to aid in the investigation (refs C, D, E). Embassy appreciates that Treasury is prepared to pass such a package to the UAEG, as it will aid the UAE in any investigation of HAI.

[1](#)3. (S) Embassy expects that the UAE Government would raise

the following concerns about the nonpaper as currently drafted:

-- Most of the information is outdated. There are a few references to 2004 data, but the majority of the information is significantly older -- pre-2001.

-- Boudella al Haj is no longer a concern. He was arrested in 2001 and remains incarcerated in Guantanamo.

-- There is nothing in the paper that indicates that the HAI leadership is complicit in nefarious activity.

-- The overwhelming majority of the points are related to HAI activity outside of the UAE.

-- The only datapoint that is within the UAE is inconsistent with what we know about the charity. There is no Abu Dhabi HAI branch (see ref B).

¶4. (S) Embassy continues to believe that taking our HAI concerns directly to the UAEG -- vice designating -- is the right approach to take. We believe that the UAEG genuinely wants to be sure that its charities are all above-board and is willing to take action if necessary. However, the UAE leadership will certainly note that the paper does not contain current, actionable information.

¶5. (S) When we take a case to the UAEG asking them to take action against one of the three largest charities in the UAE, the case needs to be well-sourced and based on current, credible intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility and no action is taken. This case needs to demonstrate that the HAI headquarters in Ajman is either influencing control over the international offices and/or is aware that its officials have connections to extremists. It also needs to demonstrate that HAI is aware it has received funds from other charities with extremist connections. Without addressing these issues, the UAE could just argue that the USG should ask the governments in Bosnia and Jordan to close those HAI branches.

¶6. (S) There are indeed many unanswered questions about the loyalties and motivations of certain HAI employees, and the natural question is to wonder how far up the chain of the HAI leadership this goes. Embassy supports passing a well-sourced and fully vetted intel packet to the UAEG so that the UAE intelligence services can initiate their own investigation and take appropriate action. (We note, however, that the UAE intelligence services only have an internal presence and will not be able to collect any intel on HAI's personnel and activities abroad.)

SISON